第137章

But in so doing there arises the endeavour to grasp the absolute as something present， and at the same time as an object of thought and as absolute unity： an endeavour which， as it implies denial of the conception of design both in the natural and in the spiritual sphere - the former involving the idea of life， and the latter that of spirit and freedom - only reaches to the abstraction of a nature undetermined in itself， to sensation， mechanism， self-seeking， and utility. It is this then that we shall have to make evident in the positive side of French philosophy. In their political constitutions the French have， it is true， started from abstractions， but they have done so as from universal thoughts， which are the negative of reality； the English， on the other hand， proceed from concrete reality， from the unwieldy structure of their constitution； just as their writers even have not attained to universal principles. What Luther began in the heart only and in the feelings - the freedom of spirit which， unconscious of its simple root， does not comprehend itself， and yet is the very universal itself， for which all content disappears in the thought， that fills itself with itself - these universal determinations and thoughts the French asserted and steadfastly adhered to： they are universal principles， in the form of the conviction of the individual in himself. Freedom becomes the condition of the world， connects itself with the world's history and forms epochs in the same； it is the concrete freedom of the spirit， a concrete universality； fundamental principles as regards the concrete now take the place of the abstract metaphysic of Descartes. Among the Germans we find mere chatter； they would have liked to offer explanations also， but all they have to give is in the form of miserable phenomena and individualism. The French， from their starting-point of the thought of universality， and the German liberty of conscience starting from the conscience which teaches us to “Prove all things，” to “hold fast that which is good，” have， however， joined hands with one another， or they follow the same path. Only the French， as though they were without conscience， have made short work of everything， and have systematically adhered to a definite thought - the physiocratic system； while the Germans wish to leave themselves a free retreat， and examine from the standpoint of conscience whether a certain course is permissible. The French warred against the speculative Notion with the spirit， the Germans did so with the understanding.

We find in the French a deep all-embracing philosophic need， different from anything in the English and Scotch and even in the Germans， and full of vitality： it is a universal concrete view of all that exists， with entire independence both of all authority and of all abstract metaphysics. The method employed is that of development from perception， from the heart； it is a comprehensive view of the entire matter， which keeps the whole ever in sight， and seeks to uphold and attain to it.

This healthy human understanding， this sound reason， with its content taken from the human breast， from natural feeling， has directed itself against the religious side of things in various moments： on the one hand and first of all， as French philosophy， it did so against the Catholic religion， the fetters of superstition and of the hierarchy； on the other hand， in less pronounced form， as the German “illumination，” against the Protestant religion， in as far as it has a content which it has derived from revelation， from ecclesiastical authority in general. On the one hand the form of authority in general was challenged， and on the other hand its matter. The content can be easily enough disposed of by this form of thought， which is not what we understand by reason， but which must be termed understanding； it is easy for the understanding to show objections to the ultimate principles of what can be comprehended only by means of speculation. The understanding has thus tried the content of religion by its standard， and has condemned it； the understanding proceeds in the same way against a concrete philosophy. What of religion has in many theologies been very commonly left remaining is what is termed theism， faith in general； this is the same content which is found also in Mohammedanism. But along with this attack upon religion on the part of the reasoning understanding there has been also a movement towards materialism， atheism and naturalism. It is true that we should not make the charge of atheism lightly， for it is a very common occurrence that an individual whose ideas about God differ from those of other people is charged with lack of religion， or even with atheism. But here it really is the case that this philosophy has developed into atheism， and has defined matter， nature， &c.， as that which is to be taken as the ultimate， the active， and the efficient. Some Frenchmen， Rousseau for instance， are not， however， to be included with the rest； one of this author's works， “The Confession of Faith of a Vicar，” (1) contains the very same theism which is found in German theologians. Thus French metaphysics finds a parallel not only in Spinoza (supra， p. 382) but also in the German metaphysics of Wolff. Other Frenchmen have confessedly gone over to naturalism； among them is specially to be mentioned Mirabaud， to whom the Système de la Nature is attributed.

In what has been termed French philosophy， represented by Voltaire， Montesquieu， Rousseau， d'Alembert， Diderot， and in what subsequently appeared in Germany as the Aufkl？rung， and has been also stigmatized as atheism， we may now distinguish three aspects， first， the negative side， to which most exception has been taken； secondly， the positive side； thirdly， the philosophical， metaphysical side.